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Introduction 
 
The open access regime existing in the harvesting of marine fishery resources in our 
country warrants stronger emphasis on invoking technological innovations as well as 
management paradigms that reconcile livelihood issues with concerns on resource 
conservation. Innovations do not happen in a socio-political vacuum. It is the extent of 
partnership between the research and the client system that decides the fate of any 
technology in terms of its adoption or rejection. Rational utilization of common property 
resources for sustainable development without endangering the environment is possible 
through community participation. For more than 6 million fishers and fish farmers, fisheries 
are a source of livelihood in India. Fisheries sector has recorded faster growth as compared 
to the agricultural sector in all the decades and is contributing in a significant way to the 
economic growth of the nation.     The vast Exclusive Economic Zone of 2.02 million sq. km of 
ocean under the possession of India is more than two third of its land area. Marine fishing 
has been considered as a primary livelihood option since time immemorial, for the 
occupants of the coastal belt in India. The marine fishery resources of the country include a 
coastline of 8129 km with numerous creeks and saline water areas, an Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) of 2.02 million km2   which are suitable for capture as well as culture fisheries. 
The annual harvestable mairne fishery resources in the Indian EEZ have been estimated at 
about 3.93 million tones constituting more than 50 per cent demersal, 43  per cent pelagic 
and 6 per cent oceanic groups. (Rao Syda, 2011) Moreover it supports the deprived coastal 
community with sufficient nutritional security which is otherwise unreachable for such 
segment.  Currently the marine fisheries sector produces about 2.6 million tonnes (2003) of 
fish per annum. About 3 million people are employed in the primary, secondary and tertiary 
sector of marine fisheries which provides livelihood security to about 18 to 20 million 
people. (Sathiadhas, 2007) 
 
Fisheries development is a state subject in India, but, centre promotes fisheries 
development through state level programme planning and implementation units. The 
development plans for the fisheries sector have been aiming at fish production and   
promoting export. India is blessed with vast and varied fishery resources with great 
 412  Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute, 
 Kochi : Cadalmin, 458 pp. 
 
 Vipinkumar.V.P and Shyam.S.Salim 
 
potential in both coastal and inland areas. But, fisheries production is showing a depleting 
trend which is adversely affecting the livelihoods of fishers and making a large population 
vulnerable. Being the open access resource, stock assessment and irreplenishable nature of 
abundance in stock, conflicts of various types become the part and parcel of the fisheries 
system in the country. To address the livelihood issue, government introduced regulatory 
mechanisms such as gear selectivity, seasonal area closures and regulations that control the 
fishing effort and catching. This is ‘top down government driven management approach’ 
through legislation. However, government managed models of management have proved to 
be unsuccessful as indicated by poor compliance of action and regulations resulting in crisis 
and adverse affects on the livelihood of fishers.   
Conflicts in Capture Fisheries Sector  : Marine & Inland fisheries 
 With regard to conflicts in capture fisheries sector, there are marine and inland 
fisheries sectors to be considered. In marine sector, each country has their jurisdiction up to 
200Nm towards sea. In India concept of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) enacted during 
1997. In dealing with management, protection and proper utilisation of living marine 
resources several conflicts has been raised. 
Conflicts between India and neighbouring countries: Some examples 
 Primarily arises from fishermen's violations of national jurisdiction while in the 
pursuit of fish. Fishermen are lacking navigational devices which can forewarn 
fisherman from trespassing their jurisdiction.  
 Political problem between India-Pakistan and Tamil problem causing tensions 
between India-Sri Lanka.   
 Fishermen in Okha in Gujarat accidentally trespassing Indian jurisdiction being 
caught by Pak navy patrols.  
 Fishermen in Rameshwaram in T.N. being caught by Sri Lankan navy.  
 Conflicts over marine fisheries India and Bangladesh are rather rare. 
Conflicts between states : Some examples 
 
Conflicts occur mainly between southwestern states and south eastern states. (Goa, 
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala.) It essentially is because of differential fishing ban period 
during monsoon. There is no demarked boundary between states in the marine region. 
(Each state has their jurisdiction up to 12 nm towards sea) 
Conflicts between fishermen using two levels of technology 
 Large scale industrial fishing vessel and small scale fishing vessel. 
 Inshore and deep sea fishing vessel. 
 Trawlers and Purse-seiners. 
 Today there seems to be change in the direction of conflicts. 
Regional conflicts between fishermen 
 Between fishermen from one state to the other. 
 Between fishermen from one harbour to the other. 
Conflicts between fishermen and industries: Example:   
 Mangalore coast is conspicuously noted for conflicts of fisherfolk with industries. 
 Shyam S. Salim and  R.Narayanakumar,  (2012).   Manual on World Trade Agreements and 
Indian Fisheries Paradigms: A Policy Outlook.  413 
 
 Conflicts in Fisheries: Partnerships & Co-management Paradigms  
 
 Inland Fisheries: accounted the conflicts in reservoir fisheries and riverine fisheries. 
 Culture Fisheries Sector (Aquaculture) 
Social conflicts and aquaculture 
 Growth of carp culture has led to the conversion of paddy fields to fish ponds. 
 Affected poor people who depend on their staple food (cereal). 
 Government of A.P.  imposed a tax on water use for aquaculture.  
 Shrimp farmer and village people. 
 Effect of dykes. 
 Effect of ponds around creeks. 
 Salinization  problem 
Conflicts between the shrimp farmers and fishermen 
 The shrimp farms do not provide access to the beach for traditional fishermen who 
have to reach the sea from the village. 
A typology of fishery conflicts 
In most fisheries, there appears to be little space available to increase long-term 
sustainable fishery benefits simply by increasing production. The fishery policy tools are 
generally limited to  
1) Increasing the efficiency of harvesting and of management. 
2) Making allocation (distributing) decisions, particularly determining who has the 
privilege of access to the fish available for capture.  
Despite superficial appearances of chaos, the wide range of fishery conflicts 
(of both the efficiency and allocation varieties) can be organized into a relatively 
small number of categories, under for inter-related headings.  
(1) Fishery Jurisdiction: Involving fundamental conflicts over the who ‘owns’ the 
fishery, who controls, access to it, has is the optimal form of fishery 
management, and what should be the role played by governments in the fishery 
system. 
(2) Management mechanisms: concerning relatively short-term issues arising in the 
development and implementation of fishery management plans, typically 
involving fishers/ governments in the fishery system. 
(3) Internal allocation: involving conflicts arising within the specific fishery system, 
between different user groups and rear types, as well as between fishers, 
processors and other players. 
(4) External allocation: incorporating the wide range of conflicts arising between 
internal fishery players and outsiders, including foreign fleets, aquaculturists, 
non-fish industries (such as tourism and forestry) and indeed the public at large.  
 
Conflicting fishery paradigms: 
While the above typology categorises fishery conflicts, the real roots of the 
conflicts which le in the underlying systematic differences in priorities pursued by the 
various fisheries players are to be given prime consideration. For example, everyone wants 
their fishery to be efficient, but the real meaning of this pleasant-sounding goal depends 
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entirely on the desired objectives which in turn vary widely with the philosophy and 
ideology of the fishery players. (Anthony, 1992) 
 
 
Fig 39.1 Conflicts among the community 
 
Conflicts and wars related to the rights over the use of land and water have been 
important human issues throughout recorded history. Although many of us are probably 
more aware of wars fought over religious freedom, political ideologies and social issues, 
conflicts over fishing rights and resources are just as common, if less reported. Since the 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) were established in the 1970s, disputes have become more 
frequent and more violent than ever before. Due to the establishment of EEZs, access to the 
world’s oceans has been radically reorganized and the access rights of foreign fishing 
vessels have been curtailed. Negotiations, international fisheries agreements (such as those 
between European and African countries), and recourse to an international tribunal have 
sometimes succeeded in resolving conflicts. 
 
  Conflict between Philippines and China is essentially due to over access to territorial 
waters. Thousands of Indonesian fishers have been incarcerated as a result of illegal fishing 
in Australian waters. While sovereignty issues are generally at the root of such conflicts, 
they are also the manifestation of competition for access to fish stocks, in coastal waters as 
much as on the high seas. In addition, the use of flags of convenience serves to exacerbate 
the problem. The country where a boat is registered does not necessarily identify its country 
of origin, and this loophole enables fishing companies to flout international fishing and labor 
conventions with impunity. 
 
Paradigm shift in fisheries governance 
  
There is an extreme necessity to have a paradigm shift in governance of fisheries 
which enables resource users (communities and fishers) and stakeholders participation at 
all levels as effective partners in the management process. Management regimes as remedy 
cover Partnerships, Co-operation, Leasing (Aquaculture) and Co-management paradigms. 
Partnership and Co-operations through Fisheries co-operatives and Self Help Groups 
mobilized in marine fisheries sector do play a vital role in sustainable fisheries 
management. (Vipinkumar, 2005). Leasing essentially occurs with regard to aquaculture 
sector. Let’s have a look into the policy and programmes for aquaculture development in 
india.  
The registration of open water body farms and government leasing determines the 
appropriate areas for Mariculture activity, allocating the rights to use the resource and 
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evaluation of environmental impacts based on certain principles to be considered to frame 
the Mariculture policy. (Mohamed and Kripa, 2010, Radhakrishnan and Dineshbabu, 2011) 
 
1. Common Property use conflicts: Policy guided by: Use of open water bodies for 
navigation and fishing should not be hindered by Mariculture. Similarly, Mariculture 
activities in open water bodies should not cause disturbances to other users. 
Permitted Mariculture by the state should be afforded complete protection of 
structure and stock kept in the open water bodies.  
2. Carrying capacity: Open water bodies have limits to biological productions and such 
limits should be defined by the state in consultation with research institutions. 
3. Environmental Protection: The polluter pays principle enacted by the CAAI should 
be applicable to pen water bodies so as to minimise environmental impacts. Pre and 
Post EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) is mandatory.  
4. Conservation: Aquatic ecosystems are very sensitive to changes caused by human 
activities and hence all activities should take into consideration conservation of 
aquatic biodiversity. 
5. Zonation: Since Mariculture in open water bodies diverse and region specific, states 
have to draw-up zonation plans in GIS formats with the help research institutions. 
Creation of Mariculture parks should be encouraged.  
 
Partnerships and Co-management Paradigms 
 
There are success stories in Asia pacific region where the alternative models have 
been able to take care of all the parameters of sustainability. One of such fisheries 
management approaches, as an alternative to the top down government management 
approach is ‘co-management’. This is a partnership arrangement in which the community of 
local resource users (fishers), government and other stakeholders share the responsibility 
and authority for the management of fisheries through consultations and negotiations as 
regards to their roles, responsibilities and rights resulting in development of effective 
partnerships. This ensures sustainability of the resources as well as improving the 
livelihood of fishers.  
 
Fisheries Co-management  
 
Fisheries co-management is defined as an arrangement where responsibility for 
resource management is shared between the government and user groups (Nielson et al, 
2004). It is considered to be one solution to the growing problems of resource over-
exploitation. If the regime is both to be effective and legitimate, introducing a co-
management arrangement, which can be defined as a dynamic partnership using the 
capacity and interest of user-groups complemented by the ability of the fisheries 
administration to provide enabling legislation? Co-management is also a mean to 
reorganizing the fisheries management system. Co-management is -from this perspective- 
an institutional process of integrating and reallocating management responsibilities and 
competence (legal power) among participants by sharing the costs deriving from fisheries 
management with the users. Fisheries co-management is based on the following hypothesis. 
The involvement and participation of user-groups create incentives for cooperation in order 
to formulate and implement more efficient, equal and sustainable management schemes 
which would benefit all parties.  
 
Co-management provides some sense of ownership to the fish resources, which 
makes the user groups far more responsible for obtaining long-term sustainability of the 
fish resources. It might also be more cost-efficient in terms of administration. Enforcement 
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than centralized systems, but administration costs may increase in a co-management 
system, as the process may be rather time consuming, involving several interest groups.   
 
  Co-management is often referred to as relations between fishermen and the national 
administration including fisheries research institutions, mainly concerning regulation 
methods, quota allocation and stock assessment. However, co-management can also be 
perceived in relation to market activities, whereby relations between fishermen and buyers 
come in focus. As market dynamics become more important to fishing activities, it can be 
expected that coordination of market performance and fisheries management measures will 
be increasingly important.  
 
Co-management is a set of institutional and organizational arrangements (rights and 
rules), which determine how the fisheries administration and user-groups cooperate. A co-
management arrangement is not a static legal structure of rights and rules, but a dynamic 
process of creating new institutional structures. A co-management institution can therefore 
be designed as an entirely new institution or can be based on already established 
institutional structures. The latter might often be the case in fisheries, where co-
management institutions usually evolve as incremental user-group involvement in certain 
management tasks. The devolution of authority to manage the fisheries, away from the 
fisheries administration to user-groups, may be one of the most difficult tasks of co-
management. On the one hand, the fisheries administration may be reluctant to relinquish 
their authority, or portions of it, and are often opposed to decentralization. On the other 
hand, user-groups may neither have the aspiration nor the capabilities to undertake 
enhanced fisheries management responsibilities. 
 
Advantages of approaching fisheries management as a bottom-up process versus the 
traditional centralized top-down system may be a high degree of acceptability and 
compliance with regulation measures, due to the participation of user-groups in the 
decision-making and implementation process. Once user groups are involved in the decision 
making and implementation of fisheries management, a spectrum of co-management 
arrangements can be identified. The figures illustrate the various types of institutional set-
up for different co-management arrangements.  
 
                          
 
In the instructive type, there is only minimal exchange of information between 
government and users. This type of co-management regime is only different from 
centralised management in the sense that the mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but 
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the process itself tends to be government informing users on the decisions they plan to 
make. 
Co-management can be an innovative change to the modern ﬁsheries management 
approach as it implies a power sharing arrangement between government and ﬁshing 
communities to undertake ﬁsheries management. However, the practical adaptation by 
governments of the co-management approach has most often been limited to involving 
ﬁshing communities in the implementation process—an ‘instrumental co-management’ 
approach 
 
 
Socio-economic considerations are likely to play a more prominent role within an 
empowering co-management arrangement. Empowerment of ﬁshing communities is a 
mechanism to give the people within the ﬁshing communities a chance to inﬂuence their 
own future in order to cope with the impact from globalisation; competing use of freshwater 
and coastal environments; and other ﬁsheries related issues. 
 
 
 
The empowering co-management approach is a demanding concept, as it requires: 
 A rethink of the logic for management and subsequently a change in the knowledge 
base for management. 
 A major restructuring of the institutional and organisational arrangements 
supporting management. 
 A substantial change in attitudes from both governments and ﬁshing communities 
towards their role in such arrangements. 
 Aspiration from ﬁshing communities and government to proceed along this avenue. 
 Capacity building at several levels both within government and ﬁshing communities 
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Co-management for Fisheries Conservation and Livelihood 
 
• Competitive Fishing needs to be replaced by cooperative fishing to avoid depletion 
and ultimate extinction of several varieties  of our marine flora and fauna   
• Fishery resources are renewable but not inexhaustible  
• Cooperative fishing minimizes capital investment vis-à-vis cost of production, 
sustainability of resources  and maximizes the earnings and profit  
• Cooperative marketing  enhances the efficiency of  distribution channel and 
enhances the earnings of real producers  
Common property:  Management issues  
 
 Common property means no one is having ownership: hence no –management  
• The literature on property rights identifies different ideal analytical types of 
property rights regimes: 
•  State property: with sole government jurisdiction and   centralized regulatory 
controls; 
•  Private property: with privatization of rights through the establishment of 
individual or Company-held ownership; 
 
Co- management: Theoretical Framework 
 
• Co- management is a new alternative management approach with a human face.  
• Co-management is an effective process for the collective governance of common 
property resources. 
• Co-operative management or co-management  of fisheries can be defined as a 
partnership arrangement in which the community of local resource users (fishers), 
government, other stakeholders (boat owners, fish  traders, boat builders, 
business people, etc.) and external agents (non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
academic and research institutions) share the  responsibility and authority 
for the management of the fishery. 
• The substance of sharing of responsibility and authority will be negotiated between 
community members and government and be within the boundaries of government 
policy.  
• The term 'community' can have several meanings. Community can be defined 
geographically by political or resource boundaries or socially as a community of 
individuals with common interests  
A community is not necessarily a village, and a village is not necessarily a 
community. Care should also be taken not to assume that a community is a 
homogeneous unit, as there will often be different interests in a community, based 
on gender, class, ethnic and economic variations.  
Co-management should be viewed not as a single strategy to solve all problems of 
fisheries management, but rather as a process of resource management, maturing, 
adjusting and adapting to changing conditions over time. A healthy co-management 
process will change over time in response to changes in the level of trust, credibility, 
legitimacy and success of the partners and the whole co-management arrangement. 
• Co-management is also called participatory, joint, stakeholder, multi-party or 
collaborative management. 
• Co-management sharing and decentralization. It attempts to overcome the distrust, 
corruption, involves aspects of democratization, social empowerment, power 
fragmentation and inefficiency of existing fisheries management arrangements 
through collaboration  
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• Partnerships, roles and responsibilities are pursued, strengthened and redefined at 
different times in the co-management process, depending on the needs and 
opportunities  
• The process may include formal and or informal organizations of fishers and other 
stakeholders. 
• Fisheries co-management can be classified into five broad types according to the 
roles government and fishers play (Sen and Nielsen, 1996):  
(1)Instructive: There is only minimal exchange of information between government 
and fishers. This type of co-management regime is only different from centralized 
management in the sense that the mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but the 
process itself tends to be government informing fishers on the decisions they plan to 
make. 
(2)Consultative: Mechanisms exist for government to consult with fishers but all 
decisions are taken by government. 
(3)Cooperative: This type of co-management is where government and fishers 
cooperate together as equal partners in decision-making. 
(4)Advisory: Fishers advise government of decisions to be taken and government 
endorses these decisions. 
(5)Informative: Government has delegated authority to make decisions to fisher 
groups who are responsible for informing government of these decisions. 
Through co-management, equity and social justice in fisheries management is 
sought. Equity and social justice is brought about through empowerment and active 
participation in the planning and implementation of fisheries co-management. The 
mutuality of interests and the sharing of responsibility among and between partners 
will help to narrow the distance between resource managers and fishers, bringing 
about closer compatibility of the objectives of management.  
• The overall prospects for co-management are good in the Philippines, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa, Malawi and Kenya. 
•  
The Stakeholder analysis 
 
Other than fishers, stakeholders (individuals, groups or organizations who are in 
one way or another interested, involved or affected (positively or negatively) by a particular 
action) that derive economic benefit from the resource (for example, boat owners, fish 
traders, business suppliers, police, politicians, consumers) should also be considered in co-
management and the stakeholder analysis can help to identify those stakeholders who 
should be included in co-management.  
 
A Case study of Co-management in Indian context 
 
There has been an interesting sharing of ideas in recent issues of SAMUDRA Report 
on the experiences and principles of co-management. All over the world, fisher communities 
are trying desperately to safeguard their access to fish resources, while, at the same time, 
being driven to catch more in order to keep afloat. The fishers of the Saurashtra coast of 
Gujarat, one of the foremost fish-producing States of India, are no exception, as a result of 
the study undertaken on “The Impact of Development on Human Population Dynamics and 
the Ecosystem” in three locations of the west coast of India, with the help of a grant from the 
McArthur Foundation. (Nalini and Vijayan, 2007) 
 
One of the study locations was the large fishing harbour town of Veraval in Gujarat. 
The findings of the study were rather revealing, not only regarding the nature of the decline 
of the overcapitalized trawl fishery, but also the poor environmental and social indicators in 
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a place that had a booming fishery for over 25 years through the 1980s and 1990s. In the 
community feedback workshops held in 2005, people were also taken aback by the findings 
of the study for a while and they were aware that their fishery was on the downswing, they 
felt challenged to realize that a large number of the children of the community were not in 
school, that there was a fall in the female sex ratio, and that there was a rise in the levels of 
morbidity and demands for dowry at marriages. As a community that is basically business-
oriented and with a desire to simultaneously claim progress, they found themselves in a 
prisoner’s dilemma. A challenge of seeking a way out by the project authorities made them 
interact with them on a longer-term basis. 
The fishery in the area is a trawl fishery along a 40-km coastline between the two 
fishing harbours of Veraval and Mangrol, which account for a third of the fish catches of 
Gujarat. There is also a vibrant hodi fishery of fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) beach-
landing craft, interspersed with the trawlers. Authorities got intensively involved in the 
fishing harbour/community of Mangrol as the community has traditionally been well 
organized. They  were also fortunate to get a local team that the local community agreed to 
host. In preparation for the work, an intensive training programme was organized for the 
team. There were also four representatives from Mangrol and Veraval, selected by the 
community, who participated in the programme. They actually represented the trawl 
fishery.  
 
Initiating change 
 
Project people did not initially mind this fact as it was this sector that they thought 
had to be involved in initiating any change in resource management. The boat owners were 
intensely involved in the training programme and, during the subsequent period, they 
turned out to be the main agents of change in the community. Besides developing an 
analysis of the fisheries crisis, they were most intrigued by the connections made to the fall 
in the female sex ratio, the number of school-age dropouts, the high morbidity rates, and the 
extensive pollution of water bodies, all in a context where the communities were well 
organized but totally in the hands of men. The inputs on gender analysis and the patriarchal 
development paradigm helped them to see the negative side of male-dominated 
communities, where women have no voice, and, as a consequence, the issues of potable 
water, sanitation and health receive no priority. In fact, the community organizations had 
seen to it that entry into the trawl fishery was limited to members of the same caste. Yet just 
as these caste organizations camouflaged disparities in the community, they were unable to 
manage the manner in which investments were made in the fishery, which, in turn, 
aggravated the growing disparities.  
 
The fishery in the area has been kept afloat by, on the one hand, State subsidies on 
diesel and, on the other, by the opening up of export markets and the development of surimi 
plants. It is otherwise an extremely inefficiently run trawl fishery, which has also 
contributed to the massive pollution in the harbours. But the government has gradually 
begun to be less lenient on the diesel subsidies, certain export consignments have been 
rejected by some importing countries, and the government has begun giving greater 
importance to developing coastal resources other than fisheries. The fishing communities, 
therefore, needed to get their act together and think differently about their fishery and its 
future if they did continue to consider the fishery as a means of livelihood.  
 
Strategies to tackle this problem were developed at the training programme, and a 
plan was drawn up to set up a coastal area managing council in a year as well as push for co-
management of the fisheries. The first step was to develop a general awareness in the 
community about the inter-relationships among the ocean, the land and the people so that 
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people understand how these affect one another. This was done at several levels through all 
kinds of community programmes but the strategy in the first year was to: 
 
 Develop a forum for women where they could discuss and understand these issues 
and, at the same time, create a collective to gradually represent their cause and 
themselves in the community organization (samaj); 
 
 Create an awareness among the youth and children about the coast and oceans; and  
widen the understanding of the fishers themselves regarding coastal-area issues, and 
relate these to their fisheries-management possibilities. For this, efforts were made to 
also include the elected representatives of the municipality in discussions related to these 
issues so that they would be taken into consideration in town planning.  
  
The most interesting results were from an active group of women fish  vendors who 
pressured the municipality and the fisheries department for a better fish market, while 
another group made a detailed study of the community’s problems relating to water, 
sanitation and attendant infrastructure, which was presented to the members of the samaj. 
In both these cases, the community’s men were very responsive and open to the idea that 
women could also be part of the co-management process.  
 
The discussions on co-management were done separately for the fishing sectors, the 
community organizations and the women so that all of them could understand the issues 
and felt free to raise doubts and make suggestions from the point of view of their own 
sectors. It was clear that there were several areas of conflict.  
 
After the discussions, all the representatives got together to discuss the possibility of 
a larger plan and who would finally meet the government and scientists to make the 
proposed presentation on co-management. Importantly, it was the first time that women 
and men from various sectors, caste and religious groupings had got together to discuss 
coastal and fisheries issues. 
 
In August 2007, an Expert Consultation on Fisheries and Area Co-management was 
held in Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat, supported by the Fish Code Programme of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), where the State’s entire 
fisheries department was present, together with scientists from the Central Marine 
Fisheries Institute (CMFRI), the Central Institute of Fisheries Technology (CIFT) and the 
Fisheries Survey of India (FSI), as well as trader, processor and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA).  
 
The community leaders first presented their ideas on co-management, which 
included both the need for fisheries management and coastal-area management, and 
articulated why they thought that this was a viable option in their particular context. They 
requested the government to create a framework of legislation for co-management, where 
both their rights to the coastal resources and the responsibilities of the government and the 
various stakeholders would be clearly defined. Subsequently, the experts responded, and a 
group discussion followed on the action that could be taken. An interesting and heated 
discussion between the trawl-boat owners, the scientists and the government officials had 
even the women chipping in, but unfortunately the hodi owners remained silent.  
 
The importance of this process has to do with the fact that co-management was 
proposed by the community representatives from a shore-based fisheries perspective and 
not a fishing perspective alone. This was possible because of the data available and the focus 
on the fishery as a means of livelihood that has to be sustained. But this is not an easy 
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process and it still has to be operationalized. The bank on the tremendous amount of 
goodwill shown by all the stakeholders, indicates that the stakes in actually managing the 
fisheries are high. 
 
Conflict resolution though Sui-generis co-management : A case study of ‘Kadakkody’ in 
Kerala 
 
Kadakkody: A linguistic aberration of the Malayalam word ‘Kadal-kodathy’ literally 
meaning sea court. It has legislative, executive and judiciary roles to play in the Araya and 
Dheevara communities of Hindu fishermen belonging to Kasargod district of Kerala. 
Kadakkodies make their presence elt strongly in four regions like Kasargod, Kizhoor, 
Kodikkulam and Bakkalam. It plays as a community based fisheries management institution. 
Though functional only in a few pockets of north Malabar coast of Kerala, these age old 
institutions are similar to many of the Caste Panchayats prevalent in rural India. 
(Ramchandran,  2004). 
 
Constitution of kadakkody: Each kadakkody is an adjunct to the temple of the 
fishermen community in each village. Ruling deity in all these temples is Kurumba 
Bhagavathy who is considered the most worshipped ‘mother goddess’ (Devi) among Hindu 
fisherfolk. Each kadakkody has three distinct bodies (1) Sthanikan(the permanently 
authorized), (2) kadavanmar/Sahayiees (temple messengers or assistant priest and they 
represent the police) and (3) Temple committee.  
 
Sthanikans are composed for 4 separate constitutional groups namely Karnavanmar 
(4 members) Achanmar (6 members), Kodakaran (1 member) and Anthithiriyan (2 
members). Karanavanmar are the high priests of the temple and they act as magistrates 
belonging to 4 illams such as chempillam, kachillam, karillam and ponnillam. Achanmar are 
six in number and are basically oracles (velichapadan) at the temple and are assistant 
magistrates. Kadavanmar are the messengers/ police. Temple committee is a democratically 
elected body. The factors determining the legitimacy of kadakkody are divine authority, 
social embeddedness, systematic procedures and behavioural norms, participatory and 
transparent process, quick and fair judgements, functional diversity, shared sense of pride 
etc.  
 
Typological differentiation of 2 forms of co-management: (Ramchandran, 2004) 
 
    Charactieristics         Sui- generis form of CBCRM      State induced/supported CBCRM 
Self Governance  High   Low 
Basis of legitimacy  Divine   Legislative 
Group of homogeneity High   Medium 
Compliance   High   Low 
Social embeddedness High    Low 
Adaptability   High    Low  
Ethos    Cosmic   Livelihood 
Norms    Uncodified  Codified 
Management agenda  Inclusive  Exclusive 
Epistemological base  Socially embedded Mostly officiated version 
Ownership over means  Exclusive   Inclusive 
of production  
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Perspectives and challenges ahead 
 
Pertinent studies of various co-management implementations have revealed 
potentials and benefits of co-management, but also many unresolved issues and problems 
that need to be addressed. There is still a long way to go before a general understanding of 
various co-management systems and examples of solutions to all the major problems are 
available. A range of issues and problems need to be addressed: Developing co-management 
institutions on a larger scale than the local community: Many of the problems and issues 
facing. Fisheries can only be solved on a provincial, national or even international level. The 
resource systems on which fisheries rely are in most cases too large to be entirely within 
control of a few communities, and Fisheries management institutions must therefore be able 
to address problems of resource access and sharing on that level. The solution to this scale 
problem may be representation within nested systems, but this raises a new set of problems 
relating to mechanisms to ensure genuine representivity and to avoid a new process of 
alienation between communities and management is initiated. Reconciling local and global 
agendas: International agreements on fisheries and environmental management are a 
special case of incongruence between scales. Means must be developed by which the 
governments can serve the double obligation of attending to international agreements while 
sharing power in setting objectives for fisheries management with the communities. 
Identifying a knowledge base for management, which is considered valid by stakeholders: 
The knowledge base for fisheries management should relate to the objectives of 
management and be considered valid by the stakeholders? A co-management system must 
develop mechanisms to reconcile formal scientific knowledge and fishers’ knowledge about 
their resource system in a way that maintains scientific validity and wide acceptance. There 
are no easy solutions to this problem. One approach may be to identify indicators of the 
status of the resource system that are both supported by science and reflects fishers’ 
observations. Developing approaches to manage conflicts between resource users who have 
acquired exclusion rights to a resource through the co-management process and those who 
are excluded: There is a need to understand the mechanisms and actual reasons behind the 
alienation process of the different user groups in order to manage these conflicts. 
Developing appropriate approaches for empowering local communities to participate in the 
setting of management objectives through institutional reform: This may require substantial 
change in the way management authorities function to provide fisheries management 
services and changes in perceptions of stakeholders on the roles of fisheries management 
agencies. These issues must be addressed in practice—in practical experiments with co-
management. It is however important that such experiments are documented and the 
experiences communicated to others who may be in the process of establishing or 
developing co-management arrangements. It is therefore an inevitable requisite that 
attempts to implement co-management are associated with independent research to 
document and disseminate the experiences. 
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